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ARTICLE
Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington
Ralph W. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic spill of millions of gallons of oil into Alaska's
Prince William Sound alerted the people of Washington to the
danger of spills in Puget Sound.1 In Washington, the danger
heightens as the amount of oil transported through the Sound
increases. Indeed, Coast Guard figures show about 1,500
tanker movements in Puget Sound in 1988, a 50 percent
increase over 1974.2 Moreover, the spill from the Exxon
Valdez taught us that, because very little can be done after a
spill,3 the only truly effective means of preventing damage
from oil spills is to prevent them in the first place.
This Article proposes a unique source of prevention: the
public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine dates from
ancient times and protects the public interest in navigation,
commerce, and fisheries.4 The trust gives to the public an
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S. in Law 1947, LL.B., University
of Oregon. Prepared with the support of the Washington Sea Grant Program,
University of Washington. The author is grateful for the fine research assistance of
Rachael Paschal and Craighton Goepple.
1. M. BECKER & P. COBURN, SUPERSPILL (1989). Numerous smaller spills into
Washington waters, such as the 3,100-gallon Texaco spill of February 1991, continue to
generate public apprehension about the dangers of oil transportation and storage.
2. Id. at xi.
3. "In spite of industry pronouncements, in spite of regulators' assurances, in spite
of the enormous amounts of resources expended, in spite of everyone's best intentions,
contingency plans for major oil spills simply do not constitute a productive response to
their subject." Clarke, Oil Spill Fantasies, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 65, 76 (Nov. 1990). As
one tanker captain rightly says, "the best thing you can do [after a major spill occurs]
is to uncork another bottle of whiskey." (A poor prescription for Captain Hazelwood,
but one that illustrates the point.) Id.
4. A select few of the articles regarding the public trust doctrine in general
include Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of
Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407; Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1984);
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easement-like interest,5 which predates all private ownership,6
in the protected resources. The fundamental resources to
which the public trust applies are navigable waters, their
tributaries, and their beds.7 However, state courts are now
expanding the doctrine to protect the public's interest in recre-
ation," wildlife habitat,9 and water-quality management.'0 The
doctrine is both a source of, and a limitation upon, legislative
and administrative power over the protected resources. The
doctrine also provides common law remedies to the state as
well as to private citizens, beyond existing statutes, for threats
or damage to public trust resources."
During the past 15 years, in half the United States, more
than 100 reported cases involving the public trust doctrine
have had a major impact on natural resources protection.'2 In
Washington, two key cases decided in 1987 give major support
to the public trust doctrine. In Caminiti v. Boyle,'" the court
affirmed that the public trust doctrine is the law of this state
and always has been. In Orion Corporation v. State,'4 the
court upheld the classification of private tidelands as open
space and stated that classification that prohibits fill for resi-
dential housing and development raises no constitutional ques-
Johnson, Public Trust Protection For Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 233 (1980); Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Question the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986);
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980).
Several articles have also been written about Washington's public trust doctrine.
Some of those articles include Allison, The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 10
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633 (1987); Johnson & Cooney, Harbor Lines and the Public
Trust Doctrine in Washington Navigable Waters, 54 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979); Note,
The Public Trust Doctrine: Accommodating the Public Need Within Constitutional
Bounds, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1087 (1988).
5. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (1987), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
6. Id. at 640-41, 747 P.2d at 1073.
7. Stevens, The Public Trust A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the
People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 201 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073 (quoting Wilbour v.
Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970)).
9. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 796 (1971).
10. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 34, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 261-62, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (1971).
12. See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 644.
13. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
14. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
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tion because tidelands have always been subject to the burden
of the public trust. 5 Thus no "taking" occurred for such classi-
fication.'" The court further indicated that the doctrine would
be construed liberally in this state. Thus, as the decisions in
Caminiti and Orion make clear, Washington is establishing a
pattern of reliance on the public trust doctrine.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine originated from the widespread
public practice, dating from ancient times, of using navigable
waters as public highways for navigation, commerce, and fish-
eries. The earliest articulation of the doctrine is sometimes
attributed to the Institutes of Justinian of 533 A.D., which pro-
vided that the doctrine applied to the air, running water, the
sea, and the seashores.:7
In England, the doctrine was well established by the time
of the Magna Carta.'8 Leading English court decisions' 9 recog-
nized that the Crown held the beds of navigable waters in trust
for the people for navigation,' commerce, and fisheries."
Even the Crown could not destroy this trust.
2 2
A. Early Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine
in the United States
The public trust doctrine was recognized and upheld in the
15. Id. at 641-62, 747 P.2d at 1073.
16. However, the court sent the case back for trial to determine whether a
regulatory taking occurred because the zoning prohibited uses such as fish farming and
oyster growing that were not restricted by the public trust.
17. Id. at 662, 747 P.2d at 1084. J. Inst. 2.1.1. The Institutes of Justinian, a general
textbook of Roman law, was issued around 533 A.D. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD
HISTORY 172 (W. Langer rev. ed. 1952). See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 633-34.
18. Clause 33, Magna Carta. For a full discussion of the public trust doctrine in
old English law, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS (1978).
19. See 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, 16-17, 39-40 (S.
Thorne trans. 1968).
20. Attorney General v. Parmeter, 10 Price 378, 147 Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex. 1811), aff'd
sub. nori Parmeter v. Gibbs, 10 Price 412, 147 Eng. Rep. 356 (H.L. 1813).
21. Carter v. Murcot, 4 Burr. 2162, 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1768); Le Case del
Royall Piscarie de le Banne, 1 Davys 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1610); see 1 WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS, 179-80 (R. Clark ed. 1970).
22. For a comprehensive analysis of Roman, civil law, and common law
development of the public trust doctrine, see PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS, supra note 18.
The author summarizes the English authorities, saying that the King had a private
right (us privatum) that could be granted to others, but the public right (jus
publicum) was held by the Crown for his subjects and could not be alienated.
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United States as early 1821 in the case of Arnold v. Mundy.2"
In Mundy, the New Jersey court declared the trust as we
know it today. The dispute concerned an oyster bed that was
part of a conveyance from the King of England prior to state-
hood. Conveyances eventually led to Arnold's ownership and
use of the area as a private oyster bed. This exclusive use was
challenged by Mundy, who insisted that the public had a right
to take oysters in this area as it had done for many years. The
court ruled in favor of Mundy, giving the first clear formula-
tion to the doctrine, saying that under natural law, civil law,
and common law, the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs
and flows and the beds and waters of the seacoast are held by
the sovereign in trust for the people. 4
The court stated that the states, being sovereign govern-
ments, had succeeded to the English trust which was held by
the Crown and that a grant purporting to divest the citizens of
these common rights was void. The court held that the people,
through their government, may regulate public trust resources
by building ports, basins, docks, wharves, dams, locks and
bridges, by reclaiming land, and by improving fishing places.
However, the sovereign power itself "cannot... make a direct
and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the
citizens of their common right.
25
Seventy years later the United States Supreme Court built
upon the principles articulated in Mundy and used the public
trust doctrine to invalidate one of the more outrageous land
giveaways of the nineteenth century.26 In 1869 the Illinois leg-
islature deeded the bed of Lake Michigan along the entire Chi-
cago waterfront to the Illinois Central Railroad. In 1873 the
legislature apparently suffered pangs of conscience and
repealed the grant. Ten years later the state sued in state
court to establish the invalidity of the Railroad's continued
assertion of ownership over the harbor bed.27 The United
States Supreme Court held the revocation valid, saying that a
grant of all the lands under navigable waters of a state was "if
not void on its face, ... subject to revocation." The state can-
23. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
24. Id. at 76-77.
25. Id. at 78.
26. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
27. The company removed the case to federal court where it stayed because the
company raised the issue of whether the repeal offended the contracts clause and the
fourteenth amendment due process clause of the federal constitution. Id. at 433.
[Vol. 14:671
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not "abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested... [any more than it can] ... abdicate its police
powers."
28
Mundy and Illinois Central establish that the public trust
doctrine is part of the common law of the United States, and
that it is a powerful doctrine. These cases hold that legisla-
tures will be held to a high standard, a trust-like standard,
with regard to these resources. The language of the two opin-
ions suggests that the public trust doctrine may be strong
enough even to limit legislative power. At the least the doc-
trine establishes a potent rule of construction requiring that
legislatures conveying away or changing the status of public
trust resources must do so explicitly.
B. The Development of the Public Trust Doctrine as a State
Law Doctrine
The public trust doctrine has become increasingly attrac-
tive to the courts and has now been applied in most states. 29
Needless to say, its scope is different in various states, not so
much because some states reject the doctrine, but because
courts only respond to cases that are brought before them.
Charles Wilkinson argues persuasively that the public
trust doctrine "is rooted in the commerce clause and became
binding on new states at statehood."3 For more than 150
years, he says, "the Supreme Court has consistently given a
constitutional cast to state and federal prerogatives and obliga-
tions with regard to waters navigable for title, due ultimately
to the key role of these watercourses in the country's com-
merce and society and in the formation of the national
government."
'31
The federal courts, however, have had little occasion to
define the parameters of the doctrine, with the exception of
28. Id. at 453.
29. See Lazarus, supra note 4.
30. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust Some Thoughts on the Source
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425, 459 (1989).
31. Id. Professor H. Dunning says: "More indicative of the doctrine's fundamental
nature... is the way the courts, the originators of the doctrine in this country, have in
some states concluded that the doctrine is so entrenched as to be immune from
legislative abolition. In those states, the public trust doctrine has assumed the
character of an implied constitutional doctrine, much like the related equal footing
doctrine in federal law. Dunning, The Public Trust" A Fundamental Doctrine of
American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989).
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Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. fl/inois.2  Hence, the task of
defining the scope of the doctrine has been left largely to state
courts. California and Massachusetts developed the doctrine
more extensively than most states with Wisconsin, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Washington, Michigan, and a few other states not
far behind. The doctrine has not been totally rejected in any
state, although its application varies state by state and its appli-
cation to particular facts has been denied.
One of the most important functions of the doctrine is to
define private property rights that are the subject of police
power regulation.33 Reliance on the doctrine can occur by
explicit legislative language' or by implication.35
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: A
NATIONAL SURVEY
A. The Initial Protection: Navigable Waters
In England the doctrine was applied primarily to the bed
of the sea and to tidelands.3 The United States, by contrast,
has large navigable rivers such as the Mississippi and Columbia
Rivers flowing inland for hundreds of miles. Not surprisingly,
the United States courts extended the doctrine to cover naviga-
ble fresh waters.37 Thus, in this country, the doctrine covers
32. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
33. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
34. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332 (1988). This statute provides for
preservation of water for in-stream "public uses," including recreation, maintenance of
fish and wildlife habitat, pollution abatement and navigation and explicitly recognizes
that in-stream water rights will not diminish the public's rights under the public trust
doctrine. Id. Section 537.455 also provides for conservation of water and use of the
conserved water for in-stream purposes, including recreation, protection of fish and
wildlife, pollution abatement, navigation, scenic attraction, and "any other similar or
related use... protected by the public trust." Id. § 537.455.
35. For example, the Orion court upheld classification of tidelands pursuant to the
Washington Shoreline Management Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58, even though the
act nowhere explicitly mentions the public trust doctrine. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 644,
747 P.2d at 1072. Under this rationale, and California cases such as City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980), the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, Cal. Pub. Res. Code
§ § 30000-30821 (West 1986 and 1990 Supp.), would also be considered an expression of
the public trust doctrine.
36. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). More contemporary
authors contend the public trust doctrine applied to navigable fresh waters in England,
too. E.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 105 (R. Clark ed. 1970); PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS,
supra note 18, at 29.
37. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977).
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all waters "navigable in fact," whether fresh or salt.
Navigability for title is determined as of the date the state
entered the union.' Under the equal footing' doctrine the
title to the beds of all navigable waters, fresh or salt, automati-
cally went to each state at statehood. Prior to statehood the
federal government held title to these lands, which were
chiefly valuable for "commerce, navigation, and fisheries... in
trust for the future states."'4 The government could convey
these beds away only in case of some "international duty or
public exigency."'" Just as the original thirteen states held
title to the beds of navigable waters, so must each new state
hold such title if they are to be on an equal footing with the
original thirteen. Accordingly, analysis of navigability for title
is essentially a determination of title to federal land, i.e.,
whether title to the land passed to the state at statehood.
Because state law cannot control the disposition of the federal
domain,' the test of navigability for title is necessarily a fed-
eral test.43
Navigability for title is determined by the natural and
ordinary condition of the water at the time the state entered
the Union, not whether it could be made navigable at some
future time by artificial improvements." However, the fact
that rapids, rocks, or other obstructions make navigation diffi-
cult will not destroy title navigability so long as the waters
were usable for a significant portion of the time.45 Navigability
in intrastate commerce is all that is required, not usability in
interstate commerce. Lastly, the waters must be usable by the
38. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1941); United
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
39. The equal footing doctrine arises by implication from the Constitution and
provides that new states must be admitted on an equal footing with the original 13
states. New states, therefore, have the same governing powers, including the power of
governance over federal lands, as do the original states. New states also acquire, as of
the instant of statehood, the title to the beds of navigable rivers and lakes, because the
original 13 states held such titles. See Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 427 n.9.
40. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894).
41. Id.
42. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
43. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
44. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64
(1931); Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); United States v. The
Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874).
45. Economy Light & Power Co., 256 U.S. 113 (1921); The Montello, 87 U.S. 430
(1874).
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"customary modes of trade or travel on water."' It includes
waters as shallow as three or four feet that are geographically
located so they have been, or can be used by canoes and row-
boats for commercial trade and travel, but would not include a
waterbody that, although large and deep enough to float com-
mercial vessels, lies in an isolated mountain area where no
commerce occurs.
47
The public trust doctrine protects the public interest in
the beds of navigable waters, up to mean high tide on the
ocean, and mean high water mark on fresh waters.' No use
can be made of the beds of such waters without meeting condi-
tions imposed by the doctrine.
B. The Scope of the Traditional Public Trust Protection:
Commerce, Navigation and Fisheries
The traditionally protected interests include commerce,
navigation and fisheries.49 These interests themselves are
quite broad, because protection of fisheries implicitly includes
protection of water quality.' Even in earlier days, the scope of
protected interests was often stated more broadly and more
46. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). This may include waters usable for
commercial log floating. See Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds
on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1967).
47. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 46.
48. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Most states extend
public trust rights from the seaward limit of the territorial sea to the mean high tide
line. A handful of states, however, recognize full public trust protection only seaward
of the low tide line. These states are Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. D. Connors & J. Archer, The
Public Trust Doctrine: Its Role in Managing America's Coasts (Aug. 2, 1990)
(unpublished manuscript).
49. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
50. In Alaska the public trust doctrine, as defined in its constitution, article VIII,
§ 3, applies to "fish, wildlife, and water resources." Both "navigable" and "public"
waters are declared to be held in trust. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3; Alaska Stat.
46.15.030 (1990); Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp. 664,
677 (D. Alaska 1977). The Alaska Constitution clearly extends the trust in Alaska
beyond traditional boundaries when it protects "wildlife," because this trust protects
wildlife wherever found. This includes land as well as water areas.
The statute also makes it clear that the Alaska trust goes beyond navigable
waters, by declaring that it applies to both "navigable" and "public" waters. It also
seems that all waters "wherever occurring in a natural state" are public waters under
§ 46.15.030. See also Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund, 435 F. Supp. 664 (D.
Alaska 1977). These extensions indeed give the public trust doctrine a broad reach in
Alaska
Regardless of where the right of fishery is recognized, it is meaningless unless fish
are there to be caught. If the water is polluted, the fish die. Thus the right of fishery
necessarily includes an implied right to water quality sufficient to support the fishery.
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specifically. In Arnold v. Mundy,51 the court included within
the protective reach of the doctrine, "fowling, sustenance and
all other uses of the water and its products... ."2 Recent cases
state explicitly that other interests are also protected. The
California Supreme Court, in the oft-cited case of Marks v.
Whitney, 5 wrote:
Public trust easements are traditionally defined in terms
of navigation, commerce, and fisheries. They have been held
to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for
boating and general recreation purposes .. . and to use the
bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or
other purposes [citing cases].
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are suffi-
ciently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In
administering the trust the state is not burdened with an
outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over
another [citing cases]. There is a growing public recognition
that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-
a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the preser-
vation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here define
precisely all the public uses which encumber tidelands.'
Similarly, the Washington courts have taken an expansive
view of the scope of the public trust doctrine. In Orion, the
Washington Supreme Court noted that it "had occasion to
extend the doctrine beyond navigational and commercial fish-
ing rights to include 'incidental rights of fishing, boating, swim-
ming, water skiing, and other related recreational
purposes.' "' The Orion court also cited with approval public
trust cases that allowed damages for harmful effects on water-
51. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
52. Id. at 12.
53. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). Marks v. Whitney has
been broadly cited by other state courts since 1971. E.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 109
Wash. 2d 621, 641 n.10, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.10 (1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988)
(where the court paraphrased the Marks holding that the "public trust protects
ecological values and right to preserve tidelands in natural state.")
54. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
55. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 642, 747 P.2d at 1073 (quoting Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77
Wash. 2d 306, 316, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970)).
1991] 679
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fowl from an oil spill,5 protected ecological values,5 7 and pre-
served tidelands in their natural state.' The court also cited
Professor Wilkinson's conclusion that the doctrine has gone
beyond its original water-based scope and now applies to public
lands that have special importance for health, welfare, and
safety of the public.59 "[T]rust principles are reflected in ...
[the protection] against adverse effects to the public health,
and land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the
state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally public
rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto."'
The court added that "[r]esolution of this case does not require
us to decide the total scope of the doctrine,"'61 thus implicitly
inviting further expansion.
However, the most relevant judicial expansion of the pub-
lic trust doctrine regarding state control of oil transport is the
courts' recognition that the public trust doctrine protects water
quality. The California Supreme Court's holding in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court 2 (the Mono Lake case)
illustrates the point. In holding that the public trust doctrine
offered an independent basis for challenging water diver-
sions,63 the court noted that extraction of water from the
tributaries to the lake would result in lowering the surface
water level, reducing the quantity of water in the lake and
thus its assimilative capacity. In turn, these reductions would
cause the water to become more saline and, in effect, more pol-
luted. The pollution would ultimately disrupt the ecosystem
by killing brine shrimp on which the birds live, causing dam-
age to the bird population. The ultimate effect of lowering the
surface water level would be to damage these public trust
resources.
56. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10 (citing In re Steuart
Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980)).
57. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). The
Washington Supreme Court said, "Recognizing modern science's ability to identify the
public need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond its navigational aspects."
Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
58. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
59. Wilkinson, supra note 4.
60. 109 Wash. 2d at 641 n.11, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.11 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
62. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
63. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
[Vol. 14:671
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C. The Scope of the Nontraditional Public Trust Protection:
Beyond Navigable Waters
In a number of western states the public trust doctrine
also applies to waters that are navigable only for pleasure
craft,' that is, waters not large enough to be navigable for
commercial use. In the Mono Lake case, the court applied the
doctrine to non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters, citing
the potentially adverse effects of water extractions from such
tributaries on navigable Mono Lake. The California court
made it clear that "if the public trust doctrine applies to con-
strain fills which destroy navigation and other public trust
uses in navigable waters, it should equally apply to constrain
the extraction of water that destroys navigation and other pub-
lic interests. Both actions result in the same damage to the
public interest."'
In United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Commission,' the North Dakota
Supreme Court prohibited the issuance of water appropriation
permits for coal-related power and energy production facilities
until a comprehensive state-wide, water-use plan was com-
pleted, taking into account such uses as navigation, commerce,
and fisheries. The court specifically ruled that the public trust
doctrine applied to the allocation of water as well as to convey-
ance of lands that lie under or abut water resources.67
In Muench v. Public Service Commission," the Wisconsin
Supreme Court used the public trust doctrine to deny a local
government the power to commit a statewide resource (a fish-
ing stream) to power generation purposes, thus requiring more
broadly based political decisionmaking. In Priewe v. Wiscon-
sin State Land and Improvement Co.,69 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court also voided a state law that authorized the draining of
Muskego Lake, a navigable body of water, for private develop-
64. See Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485
(1989).
65. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 436-37, 658 P.2d 709, 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 357, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983).
66. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
67. Id. at 461.
68. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd on rehearing, 261 Wis. 515, 55 N.W.2d 40
(1952).
69. 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896), aff'd on rehearing, 103 Wis. 537, 79 N.W. 780
(1899).
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ment of a housing project. In affirming its earlier decision, the
court stated that
[t]he legislature has no more authority to emancipate
itself from the obligation resting upon it which was assumed
at the commencement of its statehood, to preserve for the
benefit of all the people forever, the enjoyment of the navi-
gable waters within its boundaries, than it has to donate the
school fund or the state capital to a private purpose.70
In Massachusetts, the doctrine has been extended to cover
state parks7' and swamps,72 whether or not connected to navi-
gable waters. Thus, in Massachusetts, courts have held that
the highway department could not build a highway on public
trust swamp land under its general authority to use public
lands for highway construction.7" For such lands, the court
held, the department would have to get specific authority from
the legislature, indicating that the legislature was fully aware
that the highway would destroy or damage public trust
resources.
7 4
Like these courts, the Washington Supreme Court has also
expanded the protection of the public trust doctrine to non-
traditional resources. For example, when open space regula-
tions are adopted for wetlands, the Washington court has
recognized that the public trust doctrine defines the property
rights of tidelands owners. The court in Orion Corporation v.
State75 held that tidelands acquired between 1963 and 1968
remain subject to the trust burden and may not be developed
in a manner which substantially impairs the public's right of
navigation, including recreational navigation, fishing, and other
incidental uses. The issue of an unconstitutional taking of
trust burdened property interests is avoided because the public
trust easement predated private ownership of Orion's land. In
reaching that conclusion, the court cited with approval cases
that extended the doctrine to waters that are only "recreation-
ally navigable," and to shorelands lying totally above water.76
The Orion court's extension of the public trust protection
70. 103 Wis. at 549-50, 79 N.W. at 781.
71. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
72. Robbins v. Dept. of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
76. Id. at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10.
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to shorelands is important to oil spill prevention in Washing-
ton because it allows the public trust doctrine to define the
property rights affected by police power regulations. The pub-
lic trust doctrine is gradually expanding, or is being inter-
preted more expansively, as the competition for resources
increases. In his seminal article on the public trust doctrine,77
Joseph Sax argued that the doctrine should apply to resource
management questions any time "diffuse public interests need
protection against tightly organized groups with clear and
immediate goals."7" As examples of forces from which public
interests need protection, Sax mentions air pollution, the dis-
semination of pesticides, strip mining, and wetland filling. 9
Water pollution clearly falls within this test, and the tenor of
the courts' decisions is moving in this direction. Of course,
given the development needs of a complex society, states may
occasionally find it essential to convey away, or destroy public
trust resources.
D. State Powers to Convey Public Trust Resources or to
Destroy Public Trust Interests
Ever since the United States Supreme Court's 1892 deci-
sion in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,"° courts have
held that legislatures have the power, within certain con-
straints, to destroy public trust interests by legislative action.
In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court stated that grants of
land free of the public trust would be justified if occupation by
private persons did "not substantially impair the public inter-
est in the lands and waters remaining" or if the public interest
in navigation and commerce improves.8 '
For legislation to convey away public trust resources, the
legislative intent must be either express or exceptionally clear.
The Massachusetts and California courts have spoken most
extensively on this issue. In City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court 2 the California Supreme Court held that privately
owned tidelands in San Francisco Bay were burdened by the
public trust. Referring to its City of Berkeley decision, the
77. Sax, supra note 4.
78. Id. at 556.
79. Id.
80. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
81. Id. at 452.
82. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr.
327, cert denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
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court in the Mono Lake case said "we held that the grantees'
title was subject to the trust, both because the Legislature had
not made clear its intention to authorize a conveyance free of
the trust and because the 1870 act and the conveyances under
it were not intended to further trust purposes.""3 The Califor-
nia court also stated in City of Berkeley that "statutes purport-
ing to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; the
intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily
implied; if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possi-
ble which would retain the public's interest in tidelands, the
court must give the statute such an interpretation." 4
In Orion Corporation v. State,' the Washington Supreme
Court cited City of Berkeley with approval, emphasizing that
privately owned tidelands were no longer subject to the trust
only where they had been rendered substantially valueless by
dredging and filling. The court quoted City of Berkeley to the
effect that any lands still physically adaptable for trust uses
were subject to the trust burden.86 The Washington court said
that even express legislation could not abrogate the trust with
respect to the tidelands; that the legislature never had author-
ity to sell or abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over tide-
lands and shorelands; and that the legislature could not
relinquish the trust by a transfer of the property. This view
seems to give the public trust doctrine Constitution-like power.
The Mono Lake case presents a vivid illustration of the
courts' refusal to hold that laws enacted many years ago, with-
out explicit consideration of the public trust implications,
destroy public trust rights. The question at issue was whether
appropriative water rights issued in the 1930s and 1940s were
free of the public trust burden. 8 The California Supreme
83. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 439, 658 P.2d 709,
723, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
84. City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 528, 606 P.2d at 369, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
85. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1067 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
86. Id. at 640 n.9, 747 P.2d at 1072 n.9.
87. Id. at 639, 747 P.2d at 1072 (citations omitted). This view also raises another
question. Does the public have a right to walk upon or fish from privately owned
beaches? Other courts have so held. E.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d
374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972); cf. Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974) (right to fish
with boats only, and no right to pass, swim, or sunbathe).
88. Viewed historically, the prior appropriation system (including the Washington
system) must stand as a special interest doctrine. Johnson, supra note 64. Although it
purports to deal with "all" waters of the state and rights thereto, in fact the system
was designed to allocate water only among appropriators. Id. at 489-90. It was not
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Court held that the 1913 Water Commission Act89 (California's
basic appropriation code), and appropriation permits issued
thereunder by the California Water Board to the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power to extract water from tributa-
ries of Mono Lake for domestic use in Los Angeles did not ter-
minate public trust interests in Mono Lake.9'
In issuing the 1940 permits, the board explicitly stated that
it had "no choice" but to grant the applications despite the
harm that would occur to the lake. The board acknowledged
that lowering the lake level would decrease the recreational
and aesthetic advantages of Mono Lake, but ruled that there
was nothing it could do.
When reviewing the board's 1940 permit, the California
Supreme Court said the water rights were issued without any
consideration of the impact upon the public trust and that,
therefore, the trust still exists and demands contemporary con-
sideration.91 The court went one important step further and
added that even if public trust interests had been considered
when the permits were issued, the state could nonetheless
change the allocation under the public trust doctrine to reflect
intended to allocate water vis-a-vis other uses. It was specifically not designed to
include, or to destroy, public trust interests. Id. at 490. It was not designed to cover
riparian rights, because those were recognized in Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296
P.2d 1015 (1956); In Re Martha Lake Water Co. No. 1 v. Nelson, 152 Wash. 53, 277
P.382 (1929), and other cases. It was not designed to cover ground water because the
legislature enacted a ground water code in 1945. Johnson, supra note 64, at 490; Act of
Mar. 19, 1945, ch. 263, 1945 Wash. Laws 826 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 90.44.010-.450 (1962 & Supp. 1991)). It was not designed to cover water quality
management because the legislature enacted pollution control code in 1945. Act of
Mar. 16, 1945, ch. 216, 1945 Wash. Laws 608 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 90.48.010-.910 (1962 & Supp. 1991)).
Until recently, the prior appropriation system and the public trust doctrine
operated independently of each other. The prior appropriation cases simply are not
concerned with pollution. Because of this vacuum a substantial body of statutory and
regulatory water pollution control laws have been enacted, at both the federal and
state levels. Meantime the prior appropriation system has rolled along, concerning
itself almost not-at-all with pollution.
89. Water Commission Act of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. 592.
90. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, cert denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
91. Id. at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. In dicta in the Mono Lake
case, the court extended the power of the state to protect trust resources even further.
"The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation decisions even though
those decisions were made after due consideration of their effect on public trust." Id.
at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365. See also Golden Feather Community
Ass'n v. Thermalito Irr. Dist., 199 Cal. App. 3d 402, 244 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1988), vacated
on other grounds, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1989).
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current needs.92
The decision of a California superior court in Atlantic
Richfield Co. (ARCO) v. State Lands Commission9" provides
another example of the power of the public trust doctrine.
The California State Land Commission denied ARCO's request
to locate two platforms on state tidelands in the Goleta area in
southern California. ARCO contended that an environmental
impact statement had been prepared in 1974, 1980, 1982, and
1987, for different stages of the leasing and exploration process,
that it had a vested right to go forward with the platforms, and
that the commission's denial was arbitrary and capricious. The
court upheld the denial, finding that, under the state public
trust doctrine, the state-owned beds of navigable waters are
always subject to the public trust burden. The court noted:
This is the beauty of the California doctrine that all
public lands are forever held in the public use until irrevoca-
bly, physically and actually used. Thus, in conformity with
such doctrine, thousands of acres of California offshore tide-
land are always subject to the public trust doctrine until so
developed.'
The court said that the original leases with ARCO had
been negotiated years ago when there was no way to forecast
changes in certain aspects of oil development, such as the
enactment of comprehensive laws, the 1969 Union Oil well
blowout, the creation and construction of a major educational
institution in Santa Barbara renowned for its scientific study of
marine life, and the increasing need to protect and preserve
the few remaining shore areas. The court stated that the com-
mission was to consider all of these factors in light of the pub-
lic trust doctrine in deciding whether to allow construction of
the two platforms. Because of the complexity of that decision,
the commission's decision to delay was not, therefore, arbitrary
or capricious. 9
Even when public trust resources are transferred into pri-
vate ownership they are still subject to the trust until they are
92. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
365. Alaska and Idaho courts recently cited the California court's decision in the Mono
Lake case with approval. E.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska
1988); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085
(1983).
93. No. C-663-010 (Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 1990).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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filled, built upon, or otherwise altered so that their value as
trust resources is substantially destroyed. The underlying
issue is the impact on trust-protected resources. Thus, the Cal-
ifornia court in the Mono Lake case voided permits allowing
extraction of water that caused a loss of assimilative capacity,
which in turn resulted in a form of pollution harmful to wild-
life. The courts in ARCO and Orion disallowed actions that
risked deposits of oil or fill into public trust waters. While the
factual difference may be interesting, it is not functionally sig-
nificant. As the California court stated in the Mono Lake case,
the effect of a fill and of an extraction are the same: 'oth...
result in the same damage to the public interest."'
In summary, state action that damages or destroys public
trust resources will generally be upheld only where the legisla-
tion authorizing the action refers explicitly to a particular par-
cel of land and just as clearly states the legislature's
recognition that the conveyance will damage or destroy public
trust resources on that land. 7 The cases further require that
the conveyance be made in furtherance of a specifically stated
public purpose. Even then the action by the state may not
withstand a public trust challenge. In Orion, it may be recal-
led, the court said that the legislature has never had authority
to sell or abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over tidelands
and shorelands,98 and possibly cannot relinquish the trust even
by transferring the property. This requirement sets a high
judicial standard against which to measure the validity and
meaning of legislation affecting public trust resources.
It is thus apparent that the public trust doctrine, as now
construed by California and other courts, can become a signifi-
cant source of control for all kinds of pollution, including oil
pollution. The Washington Supreme Court's language in
Orion does not discourage that conclusion.
96. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
357.
97. Opinion of the Justices, 383 Mass. 895, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (1974); City of Berkeley
v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362, cert
denied, 449 U.S. 577 (1980).
98. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (quoting Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 666, 732 P.2d
989, 992 (1987)). Other courts have made similar statements. For example, in Sacco v.
Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1967), the court
said that land appropriated to one public use cannot be diverted to another
inconsistent public use without plain and explicit legislation.
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IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON
One reason that the public trust doctrine did not receive
early common law confirmation by the Washington courts is
that many of the interests protected by the doctrine were the
subject of the harbor line system mandated by article XV of
the Washington Constitution. The harbor line system has gen-
erally succeeded in reserving these commercially important
areas for public ownership and control and for orderly public-
interest development.
Article XV mandates that the state's harbor areas "shall
be forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other
conveniences of navigation and commerce."9'  In addition to
99. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1. Article XV provides:
§ 1 Harbor Line Commission and Restraint on Disposition.
The legislature shall provide for the appointment of a commission whose
duty it shall be to locate and establish harbor lines in the navigable waters of
all harbors, estuaries, bays and inlets of this state, wherever such navigable
waters lie within or in front of the corporate limits of any city, or within one
mile thereof on either side. Any harbor lines so located or established may
thereafter be changed, relocated or reestablished by the commission pursuant
to such provision as may be made therefor by the legislature. The state shall
never give, sell or lease to any private person, corporation, or association any
rights whatever in the waters beyond such harbor lines, nor shall any of the
area lying between any harbor line and the line of ordinary high water, and
within not less than fifty feet nor more than two thousand feet of such harbor
line (as the commission shall determine) be sold or granted by the state, nor
its rights to control the same relinquished, but such area shall be forever
reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of navigation
and commerce.
§ 2 Leasing and Maintenance of Wharves, Docks, Etc. The legislature shall
provide general laws for the leasing of the right to build and maintain
wharves, docks and other structures, upon the areas mentioned in section one
of this article, but no lease shall be made for any term longer than thirty
years, or the legislature may provide by general laws for the building and
maintaining upon such area wharves, docks and other structures.
§ 3 Extension of Streets Over Tide Lands. Municipal corporations shall
have the right to extend their streets over intervening tide lands to and across
the area reserved as herein provided.
WASH. CONST. art. XV (1889, amended 1932, amend. 15).
The Washington Constitution calls for establishment of harbor lines "within or in
front" of incorporated cities and "within one mile ... on either side." In 1927 the legis-
lature directed the Commission to establish outer harbor lines, marking the outer
boundary of the harbor beyond which the state can never grant any rights, and inner
harbor lines, marking the landward extent of the harbor area. WASH. REV. CODE
§ § 79.92.010-.900 (1989). The bed of the harbor area is owned by the state and is "for-
ever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of navigation and
commerce." WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1. Within these limitations, the state can build
structures in the harbor area or lease it to private persons for a period not to exceed
thirty years. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.92.010-.900 (1989).
The width of the harbor area was originally between fifty and six hundred feet,
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restricting the harbor area to certain uses, a primary purpose
of the harbor line system is to retain state control of the har-
bor area."° Thus, the state owns the beds of harbor areas and
may lease portions to private persons and corporations, but
retains control over the leased area through lease terms.
Courts have interpreted the language of article XV to allow
pipelines and cables, bridge piers and some aquaculture
projects. 01 The harbor line system merely defines the way
particular state property may be used; that is, it defines and
limits the state's property rights vis-a-vis state harbor areas.
Therefore, although the harbor line system protects some of
the same public interests traditionally protected by the public
trust doctrine, it does not replace that doctrine.10 2
In addition to the protection of harbor areas offered by
article XV, early Washington cases recognized other legally
protectable public interests in navigable water and beds of the
state, although they did not rely explicitly on the public trust
doctrine. 03 In Hill v. Newell,'" the Washington court explic-
itly approved the reasoning of the leading California public
trust case,10 5 saying that the public trust language of the Cali-
fornia case expressed the views of the Washington court.1°6 In
but then in 1932 was extended to 2,000 feet. The outer harbor line is generally located
in water deep enough to accommodate vessels with the maximum expected draft. The
inner harbor line is generally at or near the line of low tide, but because harbor areas
must include only state-owned land, it is never nearer to the shore than state owner-
ship extends.
The Harbor Line Commmission's duties have now devolved onto the Board of Nat-
ural Resources within the Department of Natural Resources. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 79.92.010 (1989).
100. "The manifest purpose of this section [WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1] is to
prevent the control of the water front of cities from ever falling into private hands."
Chlopeck Fish Co. v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 315, 323, 117 P. 232, 235 (1911).
101. See Chilopeck Fish Co., 64 Wash. 315, 117 P. 232 (1911); State ex rel. Hulme v.
Grays H. & P.S. Ry., 54 Wash. 530, 103 P. 809 (1909); see also Johnson & Cooney,
Harbor Lines and the Public Trust Doctrine In Washington Navigable Waters, 54
WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979).
102. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
103. Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 P. 718 (1905);
Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 75 P. 807 (1904).
104. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
105. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
106. Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 231, 149 P. 951, 952 (1915). The California court
had recognized that the state title to the beds of navigable waters was absolute, and if,
pursuant to a plan to improve navigation, a portion is cut off and no longer useful for
navigation, that portion can be alienated from the trust. Id. at 232, 149 P. at 953.
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State v. Sturtevant,0 7 the court acknowledged that the state
held the rights of navigation "in trust for the whole people" of
this state.108
Still not expressly using the term "public trust," the
Washington Supreme Court, in Wilbour v. Gallagher,"°9
affirmed the public right to navigate, swim, boat, fish, bathe,
and recreate in navigable waters-interests traditionally pro-
tected by the public trust doctrine.' 10 Gallagher wanted to fill
part of navigable Lake Chelan, on a portion of the bed that he
owned. Wilbour owned nearby land on the lake and sued to
stop Gallagher's fill. The Washington Supreme Court upheld
the lower court's injunction prohibiting the fill on the ground
that the fill violated the public right of navigation and would
be allowed only if some public entity, such as a city, county, or
state government, issued a permit for the fill. At the time, no
system for such permits existed in the state. As a result of the
decision in Wilbour v. Gallagher, the Washington legislature
enacted the Shoreline Management Act, which creates such a
system."'
Eighteen years later, the Washington Supreme Court grap-
pled with the relationship between the Shoreline Management
Act and the public trust doctrine in Orion Corp. v. State." 2 In
Orion, the court dealt with the tidelands at Padilla Bay, which
have long been used by the public for navigational and recrea-
tional purposes. In 1963, Orion began purchasing tideland acre-
age for creating a Venetian-style, residential community. By
1968 Orion had acquired 5,600 acres of tidelands and in 1971
acquired options for additional acreage. While Orion's plan
was moving forward, the Washington Supreme Court decided
107. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
108. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037. In Commercial Waterway Dist. v. Permanente, 61
Wash. 2d 509, 513, 379 P.2d 178, 180 (1963), the court stated that "[land held by a
municipal corporation [a Waterway district] in trust for the public is not subject to
being alienated unless expressly so provided by the legislature."
109. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1969).
110. Id. at 316, 462 P.2d at 232. The court in Orion acknowledged that Wilbour v.
Gallagher was a public trust case. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
111. WASH. REV. CODE § § 90.58.010-.930 (1990). Under the Shoreline Management
Act, each local government prepares a master program classifying the waters within
their jurisdiction and the reach of the act, including all navigable water beds, most
beds of nonnavigable waters, plus 200 feet of adjacent uplands. One major purpose of
this classification is to discourage filling and building of non-water-dependent
structures on the beds of state waters. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1990).
112. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
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Wilbour v. Gallagher,11 finding that "the public has the right
to go where the navigable waters go, even though the naviga-
ble waters lie over privately owned lands."'11
4
When the Shoreline Management Act was enacted in 1971,
Padilla Bay was classified as a "shoreline of statewide signifi-
cance," especially slated for preservation in a natural state.
Skagit County subsequently classified the tidelands as
"aquatic," which prohibited their dredging and filling. The
only permitted uses were nonintensive recreation and aquacul-
ture. The state subsequently offered to buy the land at $100
per acre, but Orion declined. Orion then sued to declare the
classification unconstitutional as an unlawful "taking."
The Washington Supreme Court rejected Orion's taking
argument on the ground that Orion never had the right to
dredge and fill its tidelands. First, the court stated the public
trust has always existed in the state of Washington."' Thus,
even prior to enactment of the Shoreline Management Act,
Orion's property was burdened by the public trust doctrine. As
a result, at the time Orion purchased the tidelands, it could
make no use of these tidelands that would substantially impair
the public trust values of navigation, fishing, water, and envi-
ronmental quality. The court noted that if the regulation went
so far as to ban public trust uses, then conceivably a taking
could occur. Because a property right must exist before it can
be taken, neither the Shoreline Management Act nor the Ska-
git County Shoreline Master Program, which prohibited fills of
and construction on the tidelands, effected a taking by prohib-
iting Orion's projects. The court concluded that because the
public trust doctrine defined Orion's property rights, the
Shoreline Management Act, as a police power regulation, did
not take any rights." 6
Formal adoption of the public trust doctrine, upon which
the Orion court expressly relied to protect the Padilla Bay
tidelands and uphold the Shoreline Management Act, had
occurred a short time earlier in Caminiti v. Boyle."' In 1983
the legislature enacted a statute allowing upland owners abut-
ting aquatic lands to install and maintain without charge recre-
ational docks over state-owned shorelands, tidelands, or beds of
113. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
114. Id. at 315-16, 462 P.2d at 238.
115. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
116. Id. at 641-42, 747 P.2d at 1073.
117. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
1991]
692 University of Puget Sound Law Review
navigable waters." 8 The plaintiffs sued the state commissioner
of public lands for failing to challenge the Act as contravening
the public trust. The court held that the public trust did not
apply to these facts, but nonetheless fully embraced the doc-
trine, stating:
[T]he sovereignty and dominion over this state's tide-
lands and shorelands, as distinguished from title, always
remains in the State, and the State holds such dominion in
trust for the public. It is this principle which is referred to
as the "public trust doctrine." Although not always clearly
labeled or articulated as such, our review of Washington law
establishes that the doctrine has always existed in the State
of Washington. 1
19
Although it embraced the public trust doctrine, the court held
that it did not require the state to charge rent for recreational
docks in navigable waters. 2
C. Other Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine
in Washington
The public trust doctrine might have altered the outcome
of earlier cases or administrative decisions. For example, in
Department of Ecology v. Ballard Elks Lodge No. 827,121 the
Shorelines Hearings Board ruled that the City of Seattle had
wrongly denied a substantial development permit to the Bal-
lard Elks Club for construction of a lodge building that would
extend over tidelands. On appeal, the trial court held that the
Shorelines Hearings Board decision was clearly erroneous and
reinstated the permit denial. But the state supreme court
reversed, holding that the Shorelines Hearings Board was a
quasi-judicial body, that it had acted within its discretion, and
that its decision was not clearly erroneous. 122 The supreme
court stated that courts should give decisions of the Shorelines
Hearings Board due deference because of its specialized
knowledge. 1
23
The public trust doctrine was not raised in Ballard Elks
Lodge, and was not considered by the court. If the case were to
118. See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.105 (1989).
119. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669-70, 732 P.2d at 994 (footnotes omitted).
120. Id. at 663, 732 P.2d at 992.
121. 84 Wash. 2d 551, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974).
122. Id. at 559, 527 P.2d at 1126.
123. Id. at 556, 527 P.2d at 1124.
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be decided today, after the Caminiti and Orion holdings have
made clear that the doctrine is state law, the result would
likely be different: The public trust doctrine would have lim-
ited the discretion of the Shorelines Hearings Board. These
cases require that before the public trust can be destroyed, as
arguably a lodge over tidelands would, the legislature must
explicitly identify the land at issue, recognize that the legisla-
tive authorization will destroy the public trust as to that prop-
erty, and assure that the conveyance or permit is for a public,
not private, purpose. In Ballard Elks Lodge none of these
three criteria were met, and the Shorelines Hearings Board
could not have issued the permit.
A second example of where the public trust doctrine may
have changed the law in this state involves the movement of
harbor lines. Article XV of the Washington Constitution
required the state harbor line commission to establish harbor
lines in state navigable waters that lie within or in front of any
incorporated city or within one mile on either side.'
Although a 1932 amendment decreed that harbor lines could
be changed or relocated pursuant to criteria to be established
by the state legislature, the legislature has never established
such criteria. However, in a letter opinion written before
Caminiti and Orion, the attorney general said there are two
criteria: (1) changes in location may not destroy the viability
of the harbor area,125 and (2) changes must be "in the public
interest and not for the gain of private parties.' '126 The public
interest requirement was the same, the opinion noted, as that
established for all public agencies. Now that Caminiti and
Orion have established the public trust doctrine as part of state
layv, the opinion should emphasize the unique criteria estab-
lished by the public trust doctrine. These public trust criteria
would strongly affirm that harbor lines can be changed only
for a public use,127 and that public trust interests in navigation,
124. WASH. CONST. art., XV, § 1.
125. Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. 62 (1976).
126. Id. at 8.
127. This could affect a case such as the following: In 1976 the Howard S. Wright
Development Company requested a harbor line relocation seaward of Piers 50-51 in
Seattle, Washington, so that a proposed development of a hotel/office tower would be
on state-owned tidelands rather than in the harbor area. The Board of Natural
Resources of the Department of Natural Resources, acting as the Harbor Line
Commission, adopted Resolution 218, relocating the inner harbor line, said in the
resolution that the reason for moving the lines was to assist the development by
avoiding constitutional restrictions. The resolution also stated it was in the public
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fishery, recreation, and environmental quality must be given
protection under the doctiine.
In addition to changing the outcome of some earlier cases,
the Washington Supreme Court's adoption of the public trust
doctrine in Caminiti and Orion likely overrules other early
cases. For example, in Portage Bay-Roanoke Park Community
Council v. Shorelines Hearings Board,'8 the court said that
any benefits bestowed on the public by the public trust doc-
trine prior to 1971 have been "superseded and the SMA
[Shoreline Management Act] is the present declaration of that
doctrine."'" However, the court did not present this concept
in either Caminiti or Orion, and the concept should not be fol-
lowed if the court means what it says in Orion: "[w]hile the
State has authority to convey title to these properties, '[t]he
Legislature has never had the authority.., to sell or otherwise
abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such tidelands and
shorelands.' ,13 As the Washington Supreme Court concluded
in Orion, the Shoreline Management Act is not a replacement
for the public trust doctrine. Rather, it is an exercise of state
police power over property rights that are defined by the com-
mon law public trust doctrine. The California Supreme Court,
considering a similar question, said "the public trust imposes a
duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of...
water .... [T]he State is not confined by past . . . decisions
which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or incon-
sistent with current needs.'1
31
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND THE STATE POLICE POWER
The public trust doctrine determines the nature of the
public's ancient and preexisting easement-like rights in certain
resources. Accordingly, it significantly enhances the potential
application of the state's police power with respect to enacting
legislation to manage oil transport activity and to prevent oil
interest. The action of the board was challenged by a public interest group.
Ultimately, the project was dropped, so no judicial decision was forthcoming. For
more detail, see Johnson & Cooney, supra note 101, at 307.
128. 92 Wash. 2d 1, 593 P.2d 151 (1979).
129. Id. at 4, 593 P.2d at 153.
130. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (quoting Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989
(1987)).
131. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 447, 658 P.2d 709,
728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 365, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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spills on land or water, administering existing regulations, and
allowing suits by state and private individuals to sue to protect
trust resources.
Ordinarily the public trust doctrine would not serve as the
basis for legislation. Usually, legislation is based on the state's
police power. However, when the police power is used to
strictly regulate private property rights, the question often
arises whether the regulations go so far as to constitute a regu-
latory taking."3 2 Because the public trust doctrine exists from
time immemorial, the burden it imposes through the regula-
tion antedates private ownership. Such a burden is analogous
to a government's easement across private land for public
access. If the government thereafter by regulation bars the
private owner from constructing a building that would inter-
fere with the public access, no taking occurs by such regulation
because the government's easement predates the private own-
ership interest. Therefore, the public trust as a basis for strict
regulation is preferable to the police power because the public
trust basis of such regulation will not be vulnerable to a taking
attack. Because such attacks would be likely mounted against
state regulations strictly regulating or prohibiting building of
oil transport facilities or transport of oil, the public trust is the
best foundation upon which to base oil pollution regulations.
The public trust doctrine also affects the state's exercise of
its proprietary power, rather than its police power, over state-
owned property. The public trust doctrine places limits on and
establishes procedures for what the state can do with such
property. For example, when public trust resources such as
tidelands are assigned or conveyed to some other use, the
intent of the legislature to change the use must be explicit and
reflect legislative knowledge of the impact on trust resources.
Furthermore, some cases hold that the other use must be a
public use.13 3 A barebones deed to a private individual of tide-
lands does not destroy the trust. Locating a highway over tide-
lands or wetlands requires explicit legislative action." 4
The public trust doctrine also influences the decisions of
state administrative agencies. As part of the common law of
132. See, e.g., Orion, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (the court compared and
analyzed the police power and the public trust as sources of authority for regulations
adopted under the Shoreline Management Act).
133. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
134. Robbins v. Dept. of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969).
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property of the state, the doctrine binds all administrative
agencies, whether acting on their own behalf or issuing permits
for another to act. The doctrine applies as common law
whether or not implementing legislation has been enacted.
Therefore, any time an agency considers a state project or
issues a permit, such as one for locating oil transport or storage
facilities, the agency officials must consider the impact on pub-
lic trust resources. 3 5  In that consideration, the agency is
bound by the substantive and procedural criteria established by
the Washington courts for protecting public trust interests.
A final effect of the public trust doctrine is the expansion
of standing to seek judicial protection of trust resources. Not
only the state attorney general can enforce the public trust.
Private individuals and organizations also have standing to
bring suits to enjoin anyone, including an oil company, from
violating or threatening to damage or destroy public trust
resources.
136
VI. PREEMPTION: A POTENTIAL LIMIT ON THE PROTECTIONS
OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The supremacy clause of article VI of the United States
Constitution provides that the Constitution and the federal
laws enacted pursuant to it, as well as the treaties made by the
United States, are the supreme law of the land and will pre-
empt conflicting state laws.1 37 Thus, laws enacted by the Con-
gress pursuant to a constitutionally delegated power such as
the commerce clause take precedence over inconsistent state
law.
The Supreme Court has said that state law can be pre-
135. As part of the state common law of property, the public trust doctrine must
be considered by state agencies similarly to the consideration of privately owned
easements or servitudes. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346; United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986); Robbins, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1979);
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878
(1970); Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968); Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wash.
2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955).
136. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 878
(1970).
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI. For a more comprehensive study on preemption as
applied to oil spill issues, see A. Rieser, Federal Pre-emption Considerations for State
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Arrangements, Legal Research Report No. 4.2,
published in ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, SPILL, THE WRECK OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ, FINAL REPORT, APPENDIX M (February 1990).
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empted in either of two general ways. If Congress evidences
an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within
that field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely displaced
state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still
preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law;
that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and fed-
eral law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress.138
A third kind of preemption involves federal statutes pro-
viding that state law on a particular topic is prohibited. The
language of such statutes is often ambiguous, and the analysis
must proceed on a case by case basis to determine if conflict of
law actually exists. In such cases, preemption is likely to be
found where there is a strong national interest. For instance,
preemption is most easily found where national uniformity is
needed, such as regulations specifying design features for
trains, airplanes, and ships. Where such interest exists, even
minimal federal regulation will preempt state law. Conversely,
preemption seldom occurs where the activity is local, and the
activity regulated affects different locations in different
ways.13
9
As noted above, the public trust doctrine works in con-
junction with the state common law of property to define prop-
erty rights. While there may well be a strong national interest
in the protection of trust resources, there is less need of uni-
formity of statutory protection than in regulations specifying
design features. The waters of the Great Salt Lake face differ-
ent threats than do the waters of Puget Sound. As such, ful-
fillment of the obligation to protect public trust resources is
best viewed as a state responsibility. Furthermore, because
public trust resources are unique, regulated activities will
affect the resources in various ways. Therefore, state statutes
that are based on the public trust doctrine and that are enacted
to protect public trust resources should not be preempted by
federal law.
138. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
139. For example, the Supreme Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960), held that a federal law imposing an inspection requirement for
ships' boilers was designed to assure the safety of the vessel and did not preempt state
regulations limiting smoke emissions from ship boilers. The Court found that the two
laws had different purposes: The federal purpose was vessel safety, and the state
purpose was air quality management. Id. at 445-46.
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Preemption depends on the intent of Congress. 140 If Con-
gress intends that the legislation, or regulations promulgated
under that legislation, preempt state law on the same topic,
then the courts will find preemption. Although Congress's
intent regarding preemption may be explicit, most federal leg-
islation does not expressly preempt state law. This uncertainty
leaves resolution of the issue to the courts.
The courts have established several criteria for determin-
ing whether a federal law preempts a state law. The Supreme
Court adheres to the basic premise that the historic police pow-
ers of the states are not preempted unless such congressional
intent is clearly manifested.141 Using that premise as a starting
point, courts will find preemption where the federal law is so
pervasive there is no room left for state regulation, or where
the federal interest is so dominant that the courts will assume
state law is precluded, as with interstate railways' 42 and air
travel. 43
Three leading cases on preemption concern oil transporta-
tion and spills. In Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc."' the Court upheld the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and
Pollution Control Act of 1970, which imposes strict and unlim-
ited liability for any private or state damages incurred as a
result of an oil spill in Florida waters. 4 5 The act also autho-
rizes the Florida Department of Natural Resources to enact
regulations requiring marine terminals and oil tankers to
maintain oil spill containment gear and equipment. 46 By con-
trast, the federal act, now referred to as the Clean Water
Act, 47 provides for strict liability of marine terminal facilities
and vessel operators for federal clean-up costs.' 4 It also autho-
rizes the President to promulgate regulations through the
Coast Guard requiring terminal facilities and vessels to main-
tain spill prevention equipment. 149
140. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986) ("In
determining whether Congress has invoked [the] pre-emption power, we give primary
emphasis to the ascertainment of congressional intent.")
141. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
142. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. R.R. Comm'n, 850 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1988).
143. See French v. Pan Am Express, 869 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989).
144. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
145. Id. at 327.
146. Id. at 327-28.
147. 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1356 (1985).
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1161, superseded by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(j)(1), superseded by 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
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The Supreme Court found no preemption of the Florida
act, ruling that the federal act provides for recovery of only
federal clean-up costs, and does not purport to provide for
damages to the state or to private parties.'-" In addition, the
federal act contains an explicit disclaimer of preemption for
damages to state or private interests.
The Court's decision in Askew also hints that different
state standards for oil transport activities that seem to require
uniform national regulation may survive a preemption analy-
sis, if the state law does not directly conflict with the federal
law. Thus, with respect to Florida's ability to require specific
containment gear for vessels and terminal facilities through
regulations, the Court ruled that the state regulations were not
per se invalid simply because the subject may require uniform
federal regulation. The Court said that resolution of this ques-
tion must await a concrete dispute under the applicable Florida
regulations.15 Thus, the Court implied that uniform federal
standards are not necessary for oil spill liability and insurance
questions. Therefore, federal regulations regarding oil trans-
port might preempt state law in the future, but have not yet
done so.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO),5 2 a refinery and
vessel owner challenged the Washington State Tanker Safety
Act 153 claiming that the federal Ports and Waterway Safety
Act (PWSA) of 19 72 ' 54 preempted it. The state law contained
four major provisions, only parts of which the Court found pre-
empted. The first provision of the state law required a state-
licensed pilot for all federally enrolled and licensed tankers
over 50,000 DWT navigating in Puget Sound.155 The Court
found no preemption of this provision to the extent that it
required pilots for foreign trade vessels; however, the Court
found that the clear language of the federal act preempted the
provision's pilotage requirement for interstate shipping.1 56
The second provision of the state law banned outright the
passage of supertankers (over 125,000 DWT) through the
150. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 331 (1973).
151. Id. at 328, 332.
152. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
153. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 88.16.170-.200 (Supp. 1991).
154. 33 U.S.C. § § 1221-36 (1988); 46 U.S.C. § 391a recodified at 46 U.S.C. § § 2101-
14. (1988).
155. WAH. REV. CODE § 88.16.180.
156. Ray, 435 U.S. at 159-60.
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Sound. 5 7 By virtue of the Coast Guard's authority under the
federal act to establish "vessel size and speed limitations,"'
the Court found preemption of the state law.5 9
The third provision of the state act imposed vessel design,
construction, and navigational equipment standards on tankers
between 40,000 and 125,000 DWT, including double bottoms,
twin screws, and two radars.'" Under the federal act, the
Coast Guard had issued vessel size regulations, but only for the
Rosario Straits.16 1 Based upon the premise that Congress
intended uniform design features for such equipment, the
Court nonetheless found preemption of the state design stan-
dards even though the Coast Guard regulations dealt with ves-
sels traversing only part of the Sound. 6 2 The Court noted that
the state law requirement of an alternative tug escort for ves-
sels not meeting these standards 6 3 was not preempted, but
might later be by future Coast Guard regulations.'6
More recently, the Ninth Circuit in Chevron U.S.A. v.
Hammond 165 provided states with substantial latitude in con-
trolling the environmental effects of oil transportation. In
1976 the State of Alaska enacted a law regulating tanker dis-
charges of oil ballast into state waters.'6 Chevron USA chal-
lenged this law, claiming federal preemption by comprehensive
regulations under the same Ports and Waterway Safety Act of
1972.167 The Ninth Circuit found no preemption, distinguishing
the decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. on the ground that
in Ray, Coast Guard design features were involved, whereas in
Chevron, the state sought to regulate ocean pollutant dis-
charges." The court noted that "[t]he subject matter of envi-
ronmental regulation has long been regarded by the court as
particularly suited to local regulation."' 9 The court looked to
the federal Clean Water Act for policy guidance, finding
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.190(1).
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iii).
159. Ray, 435 U.S. at 178.
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.190(2).
161. Ray, 435 U.S. at 170-71 (citing 33 C.F.R. Part 161, Subpart B (1976), as
amended, 42 Fed. Reg. 29480 (1977)).
162. Ray, 435 U.S. at 166.
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1975).
164. Ray, 435 U.S. at 171.72.
165. 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1140 (1985).
166. ALASKA STAT. 46.03.750(e) (1990).
167. 46 U.S.C. § 391a, recodified at 46 U.S.C. § § 2101-14 (1987).
168. Chevron, 726 F.2d at 487-88.
169. Id. at 488.
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authority there for states to adopt stricter regulations regard-
ing environmental quality and, thus, no compelling need for
national uniformity. 7 ° The court noted that while design stan-
dards have national and international effects, the release of
ballast into state waters is a local problem.' 7'
The above cases establish that courts will find preemption
quite readily where national or international uniformity is
needed. On the other hand, the courts will not find preemp-
tion where the activity is local in nature, and where it has tra-
ditionally been regulated at the state or local level.
The most recent United States Supreme Court case on
preemption in the environmental field, California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,' 72 illustrates the Court's
unwillingness to find preemption of state environmental laws.
The California Coastal Commission case arose out of the
Granite Rock Company's desire to mine limestone on an
unpatented mining claim on U.S. Forest Service land. The
Forest Service issued a permit after it concluded that federal
environmental requirements had been met. The California
Coastal Commission also required Granite Rock to obtain a
state permit under state law. The Court, rejecting Granite
Rock's preemption arguments, held that none of three federal
statutes, the National Forest Service Act, 17 Mining Act, 74 or
the Federal Land Policy Management Act 175 preempted the
state law, which had been designed to protect environmental
quality.
Of course, Congress can make its intent quite clear about
not preempting state environmental law, as it did in the 1990
federal Oil Pollution Act.176 This 1990 Act explicitly provides
that it shall not "affect, or be construed or interpreted as pre-
empting, the authority of any State of political subdivision
thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements
170. Id. at 492.
171. Id. For a contrary view, see Justice White's dissent from the denial of the
petition for certiorari in this case, in which, among other things, he questioned the
significance of the distinction between design specifications and operating procedures.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1142 n.3 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
172. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
173. 90 Stat. 2949, 16 U.S.C. § 1600-1614 (1988).
174. 17 Stat. 91, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 21-54 (1988).
175. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).
176. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380 § 1018, reprinted in 1990 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 722 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718).
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with respect to' 1 77 oil spills or cleanup activities. States may
impose additional liability or additional requirements with
respect to liability or cleanup activities, and they can impose
fines or penalties, either civil or criminal, for any "violation of
law." Lastly, the Act provides that a state may enforce its
financial responsibility requirements "on the navigable waters
of the state.' 17 The Act thus very clearly recognizes state
power to legislate about spills, cleanup, and financial
responsibility.
Thus, the nature of the public trust obligation, the tenor of
the Supreme Court's decisions rejecting preemption challenges
to state environmental laws, and Congress's explicit recogni-
tion of state power to legislate about liability for oil spills
strongly suggest that state laws otherwise regulating oil trans-
port and storage will also survive a preemption challenge.
Under the equal footing doctrine, the states were assured title
to the beds of navigable waters precisely in order to provide
state protection of public trust interests. The states own and
have dominion and sovereignty over tidelands and submerged
lands under navigable waters for the benefit of their citi-
zens. 79 While the state legislative authority over these lands
and over public trust resources generally can be preempted by
the federal government, there is no easily applied formula to
determine when preemption occurs. 8 0
State regulatory power is not presumptively preempted
without a high degree of proof, unless Congress has "unmis-
takenly so ordained."' 8' Furthermore, where the state's his-
toric police powers are concerned, courts begin with the
presumption that the federal law does not supersede those
powers unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress. 8 2 Although in recent years environmental regulation
has come under concurrent federal and state jurisdiction, such
regulation has traditionally been the respon§ibility of the
states. 8 3 Given these principles, a convincing argument can be
made that the courts should find no federal preemption when
177. Id.
178. Id. § 1019 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2719).
179. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
180. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
181. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
182. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 715
(1985); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
183. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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state legislation protects state public trust resources. The
state's powerful interest and high duty to protect such
resources simply should not be preempted by federal law.
While federal law can preempt state law, it can also explic-
itly provide that federal agencies should abide by state law.
The federal Coastal Zone Management Act 1' requires that
federal agencies acting on their own or private activities that
require a federal permit must operate consistently with a fed-
erally approved state coastal zone management program "to
the maximum extent practicable." '  The state program
should explicitly include the public trust doctrine. The doc-
trine may then be used to require modification of federal gov-
ernment or federally authorized projects to comply with public
trust principles.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC TRUST CONTROLS OF
OIL TRANSPORT THROUGH WASHINGTON STATE
Nonpoint pollution, including pollution from oil transpor-
tation, is a difficult problem to solve, so difficult in fact, that
Congress only authorized its "study" in the 1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act amendments 8 6 and again in further
amendments in 1987.187 No comprehensive regulatory scheme
for controlling this increasingly important form of pollution
has ever been mandated by Congress. Because of this lack of
regulation, the public trust doctrine provides an important
methodology for controlling nonpoint pollution. Theoretically,
any action that causes or contributes to lowering water quality
or that damages fish or wildlife habitat is subject to control
under the public trust doctrine.' 8 Needless to say, in some
cases, the legislature and courts must necessarily balance the
public trust interest against private property interests. 8 9
One plausible approach to such a balancing process would
184. 16 U.S.C. § § 1451-64 (1985).
185. Id. at 1456(c)(1).
186. Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 1155), superseded
by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 88
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (Supp. 1990)).
187. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified at
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C..
188. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
189. For an example of a court engaging in such balancing, see City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 524, 606 P.2d 362, 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 338, cert
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (balancing public trust values and landowners' interests
produced the principle that the public trust applies where tidelands are still physically
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be for the courts to adopt the widely used legislative standard,
"best practicable,"'" or "best conventional,"' 19' or "best avail-
able,"' 92 technology to protect public trust interests. This
approach would be especially applicable where public trust
resources are to be committed to some other public purpose.
For example, let us assume that Cheer Oil Co. owns tide-
lands on Puget Sound and obtains local government permission
through a Shoreline Management Act permit to build an oil
transfer facility there. Cheer begins construction, but not
before a citizen's group objects to this use of tidelands under
the public trust doctrine. Cheer responds that its permit effec-
tively defeats the public trust objection, especially since the oil
transfer facility is a public purpose on a level equal to the pub-
lic interest in the tidelands. A court might concur with Cheer
that the facility could be built, but, on the basis of the public
trust doctrine, it might nonetheless require that Cheer use the
best conventional, or best available, technology for such con-
struction. Thus, any time public trust resources are to be com-
mitted to some alternate public or private use, the legislature
or the courts could require under the public trust doctrine (1)
a full examination of all realistic alternatives, and (2) that the
best conventional or best available technology be applied so as
to minimize the risk to public trust resources. Alternatively,
the doctrine could be used to require oil companies and others
to develop new technologies where existing ones are inade-
quate. In addition to adopting a best available or best-conven-
tional standard for oil transport activities, the Washington
legislature, courts and administrative agencies can adopt some
or all of the following recommendations to fully protect state
public trust resources from damage by oil transport activities.
(a) The public trust doctrine as a basis for legislation.
The public trust doctrine can more clearly define the prop-
erty rights subjected to state legislative police power. When so
used, the public trust imposes a pre-existing public "easement"
on private rights that antedates private property ownership.
Of course, as a matter of equity, the public trust easement gen-
adaptable to trust uses, but not applicable where tidelands are substantially valueless
for trust purposes).
190. R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 109, 113 (1983).
191. Id. at 106, 114.
192. Id. at 105.
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erally would not apply to existing buildings or other struc-
tures. Whatever property the public held under the doctrine
has been lost by laches or estoppel.
The Shoreline Management Act and local laws adopted
under that act illustrate the power of the public trust doctrine
in shaping property rights subject to legislative police power.
The Shoreline Management Act does not explicitly state that
the property rights it regulates are determined in part by the
public trust doctrine, but the Washington Supreme Court in
Orion had no difficulty drawing that conclusion, based simply
on the existence of the doctrine as common law of the state. 9 3
In the future, however, legislation designed to allocate or
protect public trust resources should expressly state an intent
to rely on the public trust doctrine to define the property
rights of the regulated activity. Such a statement will draw a
court's attention to the doctrine, will clearly reveal the intent
of the legislation, and will reduce the risk of unconstitutional
regulatory takings.
The Washington Supreme Court's Orion decision recog-
nized such a use of the public trust doctrine.1 94 The Washing-
ton court held that tidelands were subject to the public trust
doctrine long before Orion acquired title.195 This preexisting
"easement" defined Orion's property rights so that the takings
question was largely avoided. Such an analysis means that the
standard constitutional challenge-that the regulations "go too
far," or otherwise violate constitutional due process or uncom-
pensated takings rules-must fail. If the public has an ease-
ment on the property, it antedates the private title, and thus
no takings issue survives.
A similar line of analysis applies to the control of oil trans-
port activities and the risk of pollution from such activities.
The public trust protects the water quality that is essential for
fisheries and wildlife habitat. Because the public trust doctrine
dates from time immemorial, it clearly antedates anyone's
right to threaten these resources or cause pollution."9 Under
193. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 47 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
196. This would apply to pollution caused by dumping wastes into public waters,
or by appropriating and extracting waters that reduce assimilative capacity and worsen
water quality, or that cause degradation of water quality by chemicals brought back to
the stream by nonpoint "return flows."
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this analysis the legislature is justified in adopting any level of
water quality control that is politically acceptable. No polluter
can claim a vested property right to continue depositing wastes
or extracting water because all such rights are subject to the
pre-existing burden of the public trust doctrine.
Applied to legislation concerning the control of oil spill
risks or oil transportation activities, this approach allows the
legislature to adopt any level of control it chooses. Such con-
trols might create higher standards for oil transportation
safety; zone against oil transportation facilities in ecologically
sensitive areas; provide a basis for state oversight of federal
activities that adversely impact public trust resources; squeeze
federal preemption to its narrowest scope on the ground that
states historically control public trust resources; or require
modification of federal and federally permitted projects under
the consistency provision of the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act.197
(b) The public trust doctrine as a basis for
administrative decisions.
The public trust doctrine can serve as a basis for adminis-
trative decisions without enactment of any further legislation.
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine as
part of the state common law, which is binding on all state and
local agencies. Accordingly, the doctrine empowers each
agency to take or refuse administrative action to protect public
trust resources; it also constrains agency action affecting those
resources. State agencies must obey the supreme court's man-
date in all actions that will have an impact on public trust
resources. Every state agency that engages in a state project or
that issues permits for private projects must consider and pro-
tect public trust resources pursuant to the supreme court's cri-
teria for protection of those resources.
As noted above, Washington's Shoreline Management Act
is not a full expression of the public trust doctrine.'98 Rather,
it is an exercise of the state police power that especially con-
cerns property rights defined by the public trust doctrine. The
public trust doctrine still hovers over all agency decisions, as
197. 16 U.S.C. § 1451-67 (1985).
198. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. Neither Orion, 109 Wash. 2d
621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), nor Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987),
suggest that legislation has supplemented the public trust doctrine.
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well as legislative and judicial decisions, as a common law pres-
ence. Accordingly, state administrative agencies should always
consider the impact upon trust resources of their decisions,
even if such decisions are made pursuant to the Shoreline
Management Act.
(c) The public trust doctrine as the basis for litigation.
The public trust doctrine establishes common law stan-
dards for judicial protection of the public's interest in naviga-
tion, fisheries, the environment, and in clean water, especially
where no legislation exists on the topic. The public trust doc-
trine, as part of that common law, can be used by either the
state or private citizens to require improved management of oil
transportation activities. For example, the Washington Attor-
ney General can enforce the public trust by seeking an injunc-
tion against an oil facility that was a source of oil leaking into
streams or into salt water. Such a suit would be especially use-
ful if no state statute covered the problem. Moreover, any citi-
zen or group of citizens, or organization made up of state
citizens, can sue to enforce the public trust and protect public
trust resources.' 99 Such citizen suits are critical where the
attorney general declines to protect public trust resources.
VIII. CONCLUSION
From ancient to modern times, through kings, presidents,
and governors, the public trust doctrine has protected and pre-
served public rights to navigation, commerce, and fisheries.
Through judicial and legislative expansion, its protection now
extends to wildlife habitat, recreational interests, and environ-
mental quality. The expanded doctrine plays a vital role in
preserving and protecting water and related resources against
pressures from rapid development, technological change, and
population growth.
As such, the public trust doctrine is a powerful legal tool
for protecting the environment against damage from oil trans-
portation and storage activity. Although the doctrine's scope
has not yet been fully defined by Washington courts, their
decisions to date indicate that they will continue to apply the
doctrine expansively. Because of its breadth and because law
199. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
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based on it may defeat a preemption challenge, the public trust
doctrine is a most effective legal tool for management of oil
storage on and transportation over Washington's tidelands,
wetlands, and coastal waters.
